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WITTGENSTEIN'S "WELTANSCHAUUNG" 
by Konstantin Kolenda 
"The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental sig- 
nificance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we 
look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)" The question in parentheses 
appears in paragraph 122 of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investi- 
gations. There is no direct answer to this question, and one might even 
wonder why it is raised at all. By "Weltanschauung" one ordinarily means 
a general attitude toward the world, a more or less inclusive point of view, 
even a full-fledged ideology. But it may be also taken in a narrower sense 
to indicate a person's favored standpoint with respect to an area of expe- 
rience. I believe that in the context of the quoted passage Wittgenstein is 
using "Weltanschauung" in the latter, more limited sense. It probably 
occurred to him that there might be something special or idiosyncratic 
about his way of doing philosophy ( I  take the "we" to be editorial). The 
fact that he drops the question without bothering to answer it might be 
taken as an indication that he would answer it in the negative. Nevertheless, 
the very raising of the question alerts the reader to the possibility of 
discerning a "Weltrmschauung" in Wittgenstein's account. Thus alerted, 
we may pay more attention to the special features of what appears to him 
most significant. 
I 
Many statements in the Philosophical lnvestigations show that Wittgen- 
stein's aim in philosophy has not changed since the days d the Trwtatus 
Logico-Philosophicus, where he insisted that "Everything that can be said 
can be said clearly."l His aim in philosophy is still the achievement of clear 
understanding. He spells this out in paragraph 133: "It is not our aim to 
refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of 
ways. For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But 
this simply means that the philosophical problems should colnpletely 
disappear."" 
What has changed in the intervening years was Wittgenstein's estimate 
of the nature of language. He came to see that language is an extremeIy 
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complex phenomenon, and that a philosopher who tries to produce a 
single model of the way language functions is bound to misrepresent its 
actual workings. If there is anything deserving to be called revolutionary 
in Wittgenstein's later thought, it is this new appreciation of the immense 
complexity and multiplicity of linguistic uses. A philosopher who (like 
Wittgenstein himself in the Tractatus) attempts to bring all this variety 
under one common denominator, is in danger of overlooking and distorting 
the distinctions which language actually has within itself. There are count- 
less kinds of symbols, words, and sentences. The speaking of language 
is a part of an activity, or of a form of life, and serves many, many pur- 
poses. Besides describing objects and reporting events, language enables 
us to speculate about events, to form hypotheses, to make up stories, to 
pIay-act, to give orders, to tell jokes, to ask, to thank, to curse, to greet, 
to pray (23). 
Wittgenstein realized that the attempt to reduce this great multiplicity 
of linguistic uses to a unity is likely to result in a distorted one-sided view 
of the forms d languages3 He also knew that a temptation to make such 
an attempt is extremely difficult to resist; after all, he himself had suc- 
cumbed to it. But he did not regard this philosophical tendency as foolish. 
He believed that the problems arising through a misinterpretation of our 
forms of language are deep disquietudes; "their roots are as deep in us 
as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the 
importance of our language" ( 1 1 1 ) . This remark alone suffices to show 
that Wittgenstein did not regard philosophical activity as an aberration, 
as a useless activity of no serious significance. 
Nevertheless, he wants us to take note of the fact that because of the 
enormous complexity of language it is bound to bewitch our intelligence 
if we are not careful. Hence, Wittgenstein sees philosophy as "a battle 
against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (109). 
In saying this, he expresses his opinion as to what philosophy should be; 
if clarity of understanding is our aim, then we should first of all guard 
against the traps which language may set in our path. Once we begin to 
lay down rules and to say that things must be this way or that, we are 
likely to get entangled in our own rules and get unexpected results. "The 
man who is philosophicalIy puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used, 
and, trying to apply this law consistently, comes up against oases where it 
leads to paradoxical res~lts."~ 
That this should occur in doing philosophy is no surprise, and Wittgen- 
stein nowhere makes light of this occupational hazard of  philosopher^.^ 
But it is d utmost importance what happens at this point. In  fact, it is at 
this juncture that Wittgenstein's own philosophical "Weltanschauung" 
seems to break through. A philosopher who gets surprising, startling, or 
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unusual results from his interpretive ventures, results which conflict with 
uses which words and sentences already have in our language, may now 
come to regard these conclusions as superior insights, yielding information 
and enlightenment. It is apparently this kind of philosopher that Wittgen- 
stein has in mind when he says, "When we do philosophy we are like 
savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put 
a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions 
from it" ( 194). 
Wittgenstein's own recommendation is to regard the occasion of newly- 
emerged, speculatively-grounded expressions as a sign d danger. Here 
something could go wrong! We could be misled into accepting as superior 
truths statements which have actually been generated by an artificial, 
perhaps even idiosyncratic stipulation. Are the credentials of such state- 
ments really deserving of public acceptance, or are they figments of 
someone's imagination? How can this be tested? Various testing proce- 
dures might be recommended, but as for himself, Wittgenstein would not 
abandon one obvious guide line. Philosophical truths should not under- 
mine our ordinary understanding of experience where it is successfully 
organized by the adequate workings d our actual language. If philosophy 
does this, it defeats its own purpose; instead of bringing clarity it brings 
more confusion. Hence Wittgenstein's conclusion that "Philosophy may 
in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only 
describe it. . . . It leaves everything as it is" (124).'j 
To sum up: Wittgenstein's understanding of the task of philosophy in 
Philosophical Investigations is the same as in the Tractatus. Philosophy 
should avoid confusion; it should produce clarity. This task, however, 
appears to Wittgenstein muoh more difficult than before because he now 
recognizes the immense complexity of language. Language being what it is, 
two possibilities are open: either to compound the confusion by careless 
and arbitrary extension of language, or to study philosophical problems 
without doing violence to the adequate workiigs of language, i.e., without 
distorting our forms of life. If Wittgenstein can be said to have a "Weltan- 
schauung," it consists partly in his embracing the latter alternative. 
I1 
Wittgenstein's theory of meaning is a consequence of his commitment 
to clarity as a necessary aim d philosophical investigation. A rough 
approximation of what he regards as the most conspicuous feature of 
meaning is contained in the phrase that "the moaning of a word is its 
use in the language" (43). On the surface, this formula may suggest that 
Wittgenstein's theory has something in common with behaviorism or 
pragmatism, but he was anxious to deny that his views on this matter 
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could fall under these  label^.^ What he insisted upon, however, was that 
if it is to be determined what a symbol, a word, a sentence means, there 
must be criteria present in terms of which the determination wuld be 
brought about. Do we have such criteria? Of course we do. If we did not, 
we could never learn nor teach a language. Hence we should turn to the 
activities of learning and teaching a language for our criteria of meaning. 
For the question, "What is meaning?" Wittgenstein proposes to substi- 
tute the question, "How do we decide that someone has learned a 
language or a part of it-a word, a sentence, a formula?" The answer 
does not seem difficult. We can tell that someone has understood the 
meaning of a word by observing how he uses it, what moves he makes 
in response to it, and what he expects to happen when he himself utters it. 
In learning how to use a language a person also shows that he understands 
the meaning of which that language is the vehicle. 
Why did Wittgenstein propose to approach the question of meaning in 
this seemingly roundabout way? He probably suspected that such an 
innocent-sounding question as "What is meaning?" may easily misIead 
one into thinking that meaning is either a kind of entity or a kind of 
process, for which the word "meaning" is a label. Much philosophical 
theorizing about meaning has been motivated by a search for such quasi- 
entities inhabiting the "mental realm," or quasi-processes taking place "in 
the mind." Wittgenstein saw that this kind of theorizing produced no end 
of problems, puzzles, and paradoxes. Consequently, he believed that it 
was necessary to break the hold of the idea that meaning is a kind of 
process accompanying the use of language. He tried to do this in many 
ways and through numerous examples. 
Wittgenstein's general thesis is that no process accompanying a word 
could have the consequences of meaning (p.218). He does not deny that 
there are many processes which are rightly called "mental" and which 
accompany our use of language. We may have various feelings, sensations, 
emotions, memories, anticipations, etc., when we use language. But the 
important point is that none of these inner processes, whatever they are, 
can be used as criteria whether one understands a word or a phrase 
correctly. The criteria are always public and open to inspection. This 
may be seen most clearly of all in the process of learning and teaching. 
The teacher decides that a pupil understands the word or a formula when 
he actually does "get it right," when he actually applies it correctly in the 
appropriate circumstances. Getting the sum right, being able to continue 
a series, uttering a correct word or sentence that the situation calls for are 
the ways of checking whether someone has understood the meaning of 
given signs or words. Wittgenstein presses the point to the extent of saying ~ 
that it does not matter what goes on "in the person's mind" as he does 
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these things-many different things may go on, or, for that matter, nothing 
,but as long as a person applies correctly a given linguistic expression 
we are entitled to say that he understands its meaning. "The application 
is stiU a criterion of understanding" (146). 
According to Wittgenstein, if there is agreement in language, there is 
also agreement in the form of life. Language is not something apart from 
the way in which people organize their activities; it is ingrained in the 
very processes and patterns of living. It is an institution. To move within 
the structure of language effectively is to exhibit patterns of behavior 
which that language maps out. Therefore the acquisition of linguistic skills 
is an acquisition of regular forms d practical (in the widest sense of the 
term) responses. A man who understands a language is guided by it in 
the moves he makes and expects others to make. 
Wittgenstein wants to call attention to the fact that the use of language 
could be compared to the mastery of a technique: "To understand a 
language means to be master of a technique" (199). A member of a 
linguistic community is prepared to act and to expect some occurrences 
following his action "as a matter d course." For in learning language he 
has also been introduced to the way the phenomena of his natural sur- 
roundings "go together." This presupposes, of course, that there are 
regularities in nature, for if nature exhibited no general laws, language 
itself could not get a foothold in experience. It would have to be so fluid 
and changing that one could never learn or teach it. But, given some 
general facts of nature (p.230), it is possible for men to understand their 
surroundings in terms of conceptual distinctions and groupings imbedded 
in the forms of language. 
Wittgenstein stresses the fact that mastery of language enables man to 
act "as a matter of course," tor move within the world of meanings provided 
by language, without consulting at every step "the contents of his mind." 
This is why we can say that when we obey the rules of language we obey 
them blindly, without interpretation, without consulting any alleged mental 
processes (219, 232,238). This does not mean that one could not remind 
oneself of what a word means. One could run through the meaning of a 
concept "in one's head," one could "parade it" before one's mind. But 
these are very special situations which are possible only after we have 
learned these meanings. 
Wittgenstein suspected that philosophers mistakenly turned to the 
special circumstances of "parading" meanings as paradigmatic of meaning- 
situations. This resulted in a tendency to analyze "meaning" in terms of 
some inner goings-on, a most persistent ignis fatuus in philosophy, Instead, 
Wittgenstein suggested that we ought to regard as paradigmatic those 
situations in which we can turn to established criteria for determining 
28 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
whether a word or a sentence has been understood correctly. Unlike inner 
processes, the consequences of having understood a meaning can be pub- 
licly exhibited. These consequences are not merely behavioral or practical. 
They are also logical, i.e., they involve a structure of connections which 
language holds together.* 
Wittgenstein's attack on the possibility d private language (243 ff.) is 
a direct consequence of his views about meaning. The crucial objection 
to "private meaning" is that as long as it is not tied in with words or 
symbols which have public criteria of meaningfulness, it is always at the 
mercy of momentary irrtpressiorz d correctness which its user may assign 
to it. What will to him seem a correct identification of a private meaning- 
be it a sensation, a feeling, or anything else-will be the correct identifica- 
tion, which means that one cannot here speak of correctness. The only 
way he can avoid this subjective predicament is to establish criteria of 
meaning which would enable him to check his own impressions. But this 
means that the criteria would have to be independent of his impressions, 
i.e., objective and accessible to others, otherwise, his "checking" would 
be no more than mere impression of checking. 
An important reminder is in order at this point. The insistence on the 
availability of public criteria of meaningfulness may be interpreted to 
mean that whenever we do not actually use such criteria we are not using 
language meaningfully. For example, in a recent article Kenneth Stern 
raises the objection that many of our memory-based statements are not 
oxlly not verified but even in principle unverifiable, for they leave no 
physical t r a ~ e s . ~  Are we not entitled in cases .like this, he questions, to 
claim to know that what we remember had really happened? Wittgenstein's 
reply would be: "Of course we are." One of the most important features 
of his philosophy is his distinction in the logical status between third- 
person and fist-person statements. He pointed out that the reports about 
our own states of mind, feelings, sensations, memories, and dreams are 
sometimes incorrigible, in the sense that the person making them is the 
final authority as to what is the case. This does not mean that his report 
is based on some sort of self-observation. In learning to use a language 
one also learns in what contexts (including one's own inner life) it is 
appropriate to use certain words in order to inform others or to elicit 
from them a certain response. Here Wittgenstein reminds us of the variety 
of different purposes for which language is used. The expression "I have 
a headache" does serve to tell the hearer how it is with me. In that sense 
it does give him some information. But is it correct to say that something 
is being described in the process of my uttering these words? No descrip- 
tion, as we ordinarily understand the word, is taking place. The utterance 
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has quits a different point; it is closer to an expression! than to a 
description. 
Wittgenstein's analysis of "meaning" does not in any way deny the 
reality of mental processes or of inner lie. It looks, he says, "as if we had 
denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them" 
(308). A person who has mastered a language can use it to refer to his 
inner states as well, and, if he is not deliberately distorting or is not a 
victim of a verbal slip, he is putting language to this use with right, even 
though without a justification (289), if by justification is meant the 
possibility of public verification. Furthermore, our awareness and verbali- 
zation of internal states takes place in the total context of experience, 
including our perceptions and our reaction to external surroundings. These 
and the role they play in our inner life are a part of the 
natural context within which we learn to use mental concepts, including 
reports of introspection, feelings, and memories. Consequently, if as the 
result of learning, a person indicated in actual practice that he has grasped 
the correct uses of mental words, why should we mistrust his utterances 
about his inner life if we have no reason to doubt his sincerity? In the 
initial stages of learning it may indeed turn out that we misunderstood the 
application of a mental concept, but then it is to be expected that misun- 
derstanding will be noticed and corrected. (A child may mistakenly get 
the idea that the expression "I am tranquil" means "I am afraid." He 
will learn, however, that the consequences of the first utterance differ 
markedly from those of the second.) 
While there are important logical differences between statements about 
the external world and statements about one's mental states, there is no 
reason to treat them as having different credibility status. For members of 
a linguistic community there is no difficulty in knowing how others feel, 
what they are thinking, wishing, intending, etc., because we use language 
to convey truthfully this kind of information as well. Sometimes the cir- 
cumstances alone will suffice to make clear what others feel. "If I see 
someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, 
his feelings are hidden from me" (p.223). There may be contexts in which 
I may be more certain about the other's state of mind than about the real 
nature of my external surroundings. There are, of course, contexts in 
which the reverse is true. But in principle, there is no reason to think that 
a person who has truthfully revealed to me his feelings has access to 
something else that is available to him but hidden from me. If he told me 
all he knows about his inner state, nothing is hidden from me either. "But 
if you say: 'How am I to know what he means, when I see nothing but 
the signs he gives?' then I say: 'How is he to know what he means, when 
he has nothing but the signs either?' " (504). To assemble reminders of 
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this sort, Wittgenstein could rightly claim, is to see "the problem of other 
minds" disappear, and disappear completely. Neither solipsism nor skepti- 
cism have a place in Wittgenstein's "Weltanschauung." 
I11 
To say that philosophical problems may be cleared up by bringing 
forward "perspicuous representations" of contexts giving rise to the 
problems, is not to rule out the possibility of formulating further questions 
about these contexts. The only thing to remember is that if we wander 
beyond the scope of clear application of concepts, our understanding of 
them will become more problematic. Here we are not likely to encounter 
perspicuity and clarity. In fairness to1 Wittgenstein we must recognize that 
he was not ignoring situations in which it is possible to "lose one's way 
about," or in which it is not possible to proceed "as a matter of course" 
along the logical paths of familiar meaning. The truth is that he showed 
a great deal of interest in such meaning-situations, especially in Part I1 
of Philosophical Investigations. In investigating them he was following his 
own injunction: If you are trying to give a correct account of the workings 
of language, don't think, look! don't explain, describe! He examined 
several phenomena in which communication d meaning, either about 
inner experiences or about external events, is, as it were, impeded. These 
phenomena should be contrasted with those in which clarity and perspicuity 
are possible, for to see this contrast is to understand better why Wittgen- 
stein was inclined to say that meaning is use, What characterizes all 
these-let us call them "unperspicuous" or "impeded"-meaning-situations 
is that it is unclear how they are to1 be used in the stream of life.1° Here 
are some examples. 
1) There are rather obvious situations in which the context of an 
utterance is not sufficiently clear for anyone, even a Deity, to know what 
is meant. Suppose we hear a snippet of a conversation: "After he had 
said this, he left her as he did the day before." Wittgenstein asks: "Do I 
understand this sentence? Do I understand it just as I should if I heard 
it in the course of a narrative? If it were set down in isolation I should 
say, I don't know what it's about. But all the same I should know how this 
sentence might perhaps be used; I could myself invent a context for it. 
(A multitude of familiar paths lead off from these words in every direc- 
tion)" (525). 
2 )  Wittgenstein calls attention to situations in which a meaning, so to 
speak, disintegrates. Upon hearing the word "March" we take it as 
referring to the third month of the year, but thereupon realize that it is a 
command to walk briskly. Or we may take the exclamation "Hail!" for a 
greeting while in fact it is intended to call attention to a type of precipita- 
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tion. Here is another even more obvious example of a context in which 
a meaning disintegrates: a shriek sounding like "help" is subsequently 
traced to an animal in the forest. 
3) A variant of the experience of "meaning-disintegration" is found 
in situations which Wittgenstein calls "seeing an aspect." He illustrates 
it by means of a drawing which may be taken either as a picture of a duck 
or of a rabbit. The features of the drawing allow either "interpretation," 
a fact which leads Wittgenstein to observe that the dawning of an aspect 
"seems half visual experience, half thought" (p.197). Here our usuaI 
ways of describing perception seem to break down. " 'Seeing as . . .' is 
not part of perception. And for that reason it is like seeing and again 
not like" (p.197). But Wittgenstein reminds us that while in situations 
like these it is proper to say that we are interpreting pictures, it does not 
follow that in seeing a knife, for instance, we see it as a knife. Here there 
is no reason for our perception not to follow its familiar logical connec- 
tions "as a matter of course"; no interpretation is called for. But in the 
case of a "duck-rabbit" the logical consequences of taking the drawing 
in one or the other way will be correspondingly different. Apart from 
that, aspect-seeing is not problematic. 
4) Other situations may be more problematic. A drawing of a triangle, 
for instance, may be "taken" in many different ways. It can be seen "as a 
triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as standing on its 
base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow 
or pointer, as an overturned object which is meant to stand on the shorter 
side of the right angle, as a half-parallelogram, and as various other 
things" (p.200). While the drawing itself imposes no one interpretation, 
it allows a whole range of them, but, of course, within certain limits. One 
could give the drawing some specific form by looking for it "in another 
dimension," as Wittgenstein puts it. Here, it seems, imagination is invited 
to supply the interpretation. Not all interpretations would be equally 
natural. It would take much imagination to see the triangle as an arrow, 
for instance, or as an object that has fallen over. It is natural to see the 
diagram of a cube as a box, but do we supply in imagination also the 
material out of which the box is made? No, here we would be moving 
toward constructing fiction. It is possible to  give meaning to drawings or 
signs by surrounding them with fiction. One may see them in various 
aspects, depending on the way one takes them (p.210). In contexts like 
these one is free to supply the meaning. "Seeing an aspect and imagining 
are subject to the will. There is such an order as 'Imagine this,' and also: 
'Now see the figure like this;' but not 'Now see this leaf green' " (p.213). 
5) We may occasionally be inclined to combine meanings without 
really knowing what the effects of this combination may be. Thus Wittgen- 
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stein, for instance, raises what looks like a most outlandish question: 
"Given the two ideas 'fat' and 'lean,' would you be rather inclined to say 
that Wednesday was fat and Tuesday lean, or the other way around?" 
(p.216). He confesses that he is inclined to choose the former, and 
claims that it might be even possible to form hypotheses about this 
inclination, e.g., associations from his childhood. But he insists that this 
extraordinary application does not change the ordinary meanings of the 
words involved. If one can give secondary senses to words, he adds, it is 
only because one knows their primary sense. 
What is important about all the above "meaning-situations" is that they 
may be "taken" in different ways. They are not governed by criteria laying 
down a matter-of-course use. They call for interpretation, imagination, or 
hypothesis. It is possible to give them more or less definite meanings, but 
in doing so we would be manifesting our subjective inclinations, desires, 
personal insights. The moves we make here are subject to our will. It is 
at this point that we might again discern Wittgenstein's "Weltanschauung." 
He saw a resemblance between such unclear meaning-situations and 
philosophical problems. For he says: "A philosophical problem has the 
form: 'I don't know my way about' " (123). There are no "matter-of- 
course7' soIutions here, because criteria for such solutions are lacking. But, 
despite occasional provocations, we should not jump to, the conclusion 
that for Wittgenstein philosophical problems are exactly like some of the 
unclear meaning-situations illustrated above. They are like them and again 
not like. Philosophical problems lie "in another dimension." Not all 
uncertainties of meaning are felt as deep disquietudes, and not all prob- 
lems arising out of the complexity of language appear to be of great 
importance. The point of the similarity is rather that in either case there is 
no one set of criteria which could be applied, but there is a possibility, 
even likelihood, of arbitrary, idiosyncratic solutions. It seems that one of 
Wittgenstein's main objectives was to call attention to this fact. 
IV 
Since Wittgenstein's professed ideal was clarity, we can expect him to 
be suspicious of statements and pronouncements which give prominence 
to the philosopher's imagination. For then they lead away from clarity into 
predicaments in which one "does not know his way about." We must not 
forget that Wittgenstein's anti-speculative attitude is partly directed against 
himself, the author of the Tractatus.ll Apparently he saw the fruitlessness 
of the verbal legislation he tried to undertake in that work. Possibly he 
suspected that linguistic legislation of philosophers is likely to contain 
private idiosyncratic predilection or even special pleading. 
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On the other hand, nowhere do we find in Wittgenstein's later writings 
an outright injunction: don't speculate, don't make linguistic proposals. 
Such an injunotion would indeed be out of harmony with his own growing 
appreciation of the multiplicity of uses to which language may be put. And 
certainly the speculative use of language is nothing new under the sun. 
Furthermore, Wittgenstein also recognized that ordinary language itself 
may lead to mental cramps. 
Our ordi.lary language, which of all possible notations is the one which per- 
vades all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, and in 
this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as 
well. Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference more 
strongly, makes it more obvious, than ordinary language does, or one which 
in a particular case uses more closely similar forms of expression than our 
ordinary language. Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown the 
notations which fulfill these needs. These needs can be of the greatest variety.'' 
Although our language is all right as it is, i.e., has adequate criteria for 
distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless, true and false state- 
ments, it can nevertheless mislead and bewitch us by covering up some 
possible distinctions.13 It is Wittgenstein who calls our attention to the 
fact that "we remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity d all the 
every-day language-games because the clothing of our language makes 
everything alike" (p.224). This is why he believed that in order to "see 
connections" it is important to find and to invent intermediate cases, in 
addition to getting hold of "perspicuous representations" (122). He also 
introduced a distinction between "surface grammar" and "depth grammar" 
(664). It may be a legitimate and an important task for a philosopher to 
explore connections which the surface grammar ignores. 
Wittgenstein is not saying: "don't speculate," but rather, "if you do 
speculate, know that this is what you are doing." The predicament d a 
fly in a fly bottle is that the fly does not know where it is. When Witt- 
genstein says that his aim in philosophy is to show the fly the way out 
of the fly bottle (309), he is not making invidious mmparisoas but intends 
to draw some helpful analogies. When a philosopher gets entangled in his 
own rules he may not be able to see that he is actually caught in them. 
Like a fly which bumps against the invisible walls, he moves ineffectively 
within the self-imposed confinement. He can leave it the same way that a 
fly can-by getting out the same way he came in. Taken in this light, the 
analogy seems to be far from disparaging, but does indeed illustrate 
Wittgenstein's point that in philosophy it is possible to become boxed-in 
by one's own concepts without realizing that this is what has happened. 
One of the most frequent philosophical diseases to which Wittgenstein 
wants to alert us is the illusion of understanding. Sometimes the form of 
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a sentence may be so deceptively innocent that we may be inclined to say 
that we understand it. Take Wittgenstein's example: "It is five o'clock on 
the sun." I t  seems to make good sense-until we ask ourselves how we 
would go about determining what time it is on the sun. Then we would 
realize that the "surroundings" which make time calculations on earth 
meaningful are missing when we try to use the same determination with 
respect to the sun. In other words, the logical consequences of the state- 
ment "It is five o'clock in Londonyy are quite different from those of the 
statement "It is five o'clock on the sun." In fact, we have no idea what 
the latter would be; we are in a fly bottle. 
Wittgenstein recommends that in cases like this we should remind our- 
selves of the original home of the expression, give ourselves its "perspicu- 
ous representation." This will save us from many a puzzle. All our concepts 
derive their meaning from their "natural surroundings," and if they are 
transferred into different surroundings we no longer know how to apply 
them. "If a lion could talk we could not understand him," says Wittgen- 
stein (p.223). Why? Because what we understand by "talking" is so 
intimately involved in our human form d life, including the possibilities 
and limitations imposed upon us by our constitution, that a talking lion 
would have to "take on" all these surroundings in order to talk. But then 
he wouId cease being a li~n.~"imilar considerations lead Wittgenstein 
to observe that "the human body is the best picture of the human soul" 
(p.178), or to conclude that it is not a matter of finding out whether 
machines can think. "But a machine surely cannot think!-Is that an 
empirical statement? No. We only say of a human being and what is like 
one that it thinks" (360).15 To understand the task of philosophy in this 
way is to be no longer tormented by questions which bring philosophy 
itself in question. This for Wittgenstein is a real discovery, for it makes 
him capable of stopping doing philosophy when he wants to. "Problems 
are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem" (1 33). 
Wittgenstein, as we have seen, does not deny that it is possible to give 
meaning to sentences which as yet have no definite meaning. One can 
provide definitions, interpretations, one can surround symbols with fiction. 
In many cases such stipulative effort of imagination may lead to seeing, 
new connections. This is what a philosopher claims when he produces1 
accounts which bring out or underscore elements of experience which in( 
his view have been negIected or obscured by the clothing of current' 
linguistic usage. He may claim, for instance, that we get a more adequate 
grasp of the nature of our experience if we think of all reality as process, 
or that we will understand ourselves better if we realize that "existence 
precedes essence." But it is important to note that these statements wil 
have the meaning assigned to them only within the special context of 
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statements contained in the philosopher's work; without the support of 
such special context their application will be problematic, to say the least. 
~ h u s ,  the concept of '"prehension" or of "dread" may have a special 
meaning within the body of language created by Whitehead or Heidegger, 
but will have no such meaning outside the context of their philosophies. 
This does not mean that nothing can be gained from trying to invent new 
ways of speaking for special purposes, but it is important to know both 
the purposes and the ways in which the new notation proposes to 
articulate them. 
From what we know about Wittgenstein the man we certainly cannot 
conclude that he had no sense of philosophical wonder. On the contrary, 
his attitude toward the fact of existence had something in common with a 
religious or mystical attitude. He says in the Tractatus (644): "Not how 
the world is, is the mystical, but that it is."16 The questions of ultimate 
purpose or of human destiny were not indifferent to Wittgenstein. Only 
that he found it extremely difficult to say something meaningful about 
them. All his life he strove to reach the depth of his own humanity, and 
drove himself relentlessly in trying to extract something meaningful and 
lasting out of his own special talents. 
It may sound paradoxical, but I believe that Wittgenstein could be 
regarded as a true existentialist. At least he was truer to the theme of 
existentialism than were many of its professed followers, for he had no 
existentialist philosophy. He seems to have felt that the spiritual affairs 
of a man are truly his own personal affairs. Among the writers he admired 
most were the thinkers who were concerned with the depth of man's 
subjectivity: St. Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, and Dostoyevsky. 
Wittgenstein apparently felt that on "ultimate" questions a novelist like 
Tolstoy can speak more honestly, for he speaks out for himself, out of his 
own subjective depth. He does not pretend to purvey universal wisdom, 
true for all times and places-a temptation philosophers find hard to resist. 
When Heidegger sought help from poets in his search for the roots of 
being, he did not hesitate to expound their insights philosophically. Witt- 
genstein would find such an undertaking overwhelming. But not because 
he underestimated the power of poetry.17 He was too scrupuIous and too 
honest a thinker tor claim clarity and understanding where objectivity and 
certainty are not to be had. While holding in highest esteem the halting 
ventures of the human spirit to comprehend itself, he believed that they 
should not be paraded as universally valid philosophical truths. That, too, 
was a part of his "Weltanschauung." 
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